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A POWERLESS COMPANION:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF
NEOLIBERALISM
SAMUEL MOYN*
I
INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly common to claim that international human rights law is a
neoliberal phenomenon. And certainly the common timing is right: the human
rights revolution and the victory of market fundamentalism have been
simultaneous. In an important new essay, Marxist international lawyer Susan
Marks compares Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine with my own recent history
of international human rights, which emphasizes the 1970s as the moment of
breakthrough for their ascent. Both histories, Marks observes, ascribe the
newfound visibility of human rights to their promise to transcend formerly
attractive political options east and west that seemed inadequate or even
1
dangerous. “For her too,” Marks acknowledges of Klein’s treatment, “the
human rights movement as we know it today took shape during the 1970s. And
for her too, a defining characteristic of the new movement was its non-political
2
creed.” But for Marks, Klein succeeds by unveiling the neoliberal
circumstances of human rights that have permanently defined their trajectory:
[S]he considers that a rather important aspect of the context for the movement’s
emergence is one Moyn omits to mention: the rise in that period of the neo-liberal
version of ‘private’ capitalism, with its now familiar policy prescription of
privatisation, deregulation and state retreat from social provision. To its influential
enthusiasts then and now, that is the last utopia. . . . From Klein’s perspective, then,
the history of human3 rights cannot be told in isolation from developments in the
history of capitalism.”

(At this point Marks notes that Milton Friedman won the Nobel prize for
economics in 1976, the year before Amnesty International was given the Nobel
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1. See Susan Marks, Four Human Rights Myths in HUMAN RIGHTS: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW
POSSIBILITIES 217 (Kinley et al. eds., 2013). See also NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE
OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 11 (2007); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HISTORY (2010); Samuel Moyn, Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography of Human
Rights, 8 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 123 (2012).
2. Marks, supra note 1, at 226.
3. Marks, supra note 1, at 226 and 226 n.44.

MOYN_BOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

148

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1/9/2015 12:33 AM

[Vol. 77:147

peace prize.)
Friedrich Hayek, the guru of neoliberalism, was as impressed a witness of
the human rights revolution of the 1970s as anyone else. But it is interesting
that, although occasionally an advocate of the constitutionalization of basic
liberties like freedom of speech and press, he was in fact an acerbic critic of that
revolution. In an interview, he described the spike in talk around human rights
associated with Jimmy Carter’s election to the American presidency as a
strange fad, which (like all fashions) risked excess:
I’m not sure whether it’s an invention of the present administration or whether it’s of
an older date, but I suppose if you told an eighteen year old that human rights is a new
discovery he wouldn’t believe it. He would have thought the United States for 200
years has been committed to human rights, which of course would be absurd. The
United States discovered human rights two years ago or five years ago. Suddenly it’s
the main object and leads to a degree of interference with the policy of other countries
which, even if I sympathized with the general aim, I don’t think
it’s in the least
4
justified. . . . But it’s a dominating belief in the United States now.

All the same, since that moment of modish popularity, the staying power of
human rights has led to many more positive visions of the essential harmony—if
not identity—of economic liberalism and international human rights. The
Marxist left, indeed, is hardly the only source of claims concerning the
synergetic relationship between the advancement of market freedoms and
5
human rights. If anything, it is much more common to promote neoliberalism
as an agent of the advancement of human rights rather than to link them as
malign accomplices.
Perhaps most notably, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues that, although
human rights law may exact some costs to efficiency, the general relationship
between economic liberty and human rights is productive and strong, so much
6
so that promoting the former and latter are not very different enterprises. He
writes:
[E]njoyment of human rights require[s] the use of dispersed information and
economic resources that can be supplied most efficiently, and most democratically,
through the division of labour among free citizens and through liberal trade promoting
economic welfare, the freedom of choice and the free flow of scarce goods, services,
7
and information across frontiers in response to supply and demand by citizens.

There is, accordingly, little daylight between economic liberalization and the
promotion of international human rights. And though Petersmann’s optimism

4. Interview by Robert Chitester with Friedrich A. Hayek, at UCLA (1978), available at
http://www.hayek.ufm.edu/index.php?title=Bob_Chitester_part_I&p=video1&b=930&e=1037.
5. Admittedly, others nearly always construe “human rights” as a set of abstract values rather
than a set of concrete movements and legal regimes. See, e.g., JOHN C. W. TOUCHIE, HAYEK AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS FOR A MINIMALIST APPROACH TO LAW (2005).
6. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations “Global Compact” for Integrating Human
Rights in the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. OF INT’L
L. 621, 621–22 (2002). See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law:
Defining and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Thomas
Cottier et al. eds., 2005).
7. Petersmann, Time for a United Nations, supra note 6, at 629.
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about near identity has certainly drawn their fire, mainstream international
human rights lawyers generally envision a large zone of compatibility between
their norms and standard market arrangements; they merely insist that the
values of international human rights need to be kept separate so as to provide
8
critical purchase on “globalization” if and when it goes wrong. In the
mainstream vision, international human rights can offer a toolbox of legal and
other standards to guide, tame, and “civilize” an era of transnational market
9
liberalization that has generally improved the human condition.
This article argues that it is far too soon—analytically in the one case and
historically in the other—to sign on to either the Marxist or mainstream
position about the relationship between human rights and neoliberalism. To the
first position, much more analytical clarity is required to prove more than a
simple case of conjuncture between the two phenomena that are sometimes too
easily conflated. To the second, the record so far suggests that human rights
seem fit to provide little, if any, help in remedying (let alone overturning) the
development in the history of capitalism that its critics range under the heading
“neoliberalism.” In largest part that is because, although the record of
capitalism in our time is highly mixed when it comes to the achievement and
violation of basic human rights, its most serious victim is equality (of resources
and opportunities alike) both in national and global settings—a value that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the international human
10
rights movements following in its wake do not even set out to defend. Since
globalizing neoliberalism and international human rights emerged at the same
moment and developed in parallel, there are undoubtedly connections to be
found. But the interactions between human rights and neoliberalism are more
subtle than Marxists so far claim. Indeed, the crucial connection is a missed
connection: precisely because the human rights revolution has at its most
ambitious dedicated itself to establishing a normative and actual floor for
protection, it has failed to respond to—or even allowed for recognizing—
neoliberalism’s obliteration of the ceiling on inequality.
“Neoliberalism,” especially in leftist discourse, often does massive work in
diverse settings of argument, coming close through its overuse to functioning as
a call for explanation rather than the real thing. And with its moral charge, it is
sometimes deployed like holy water, sprinkled liberally for safety’s sake to ward
off evil. Although its rise as an item of discourse and apotropaic talisman

8. Philip Alston has famously alleged that Petersmann’s goal was “to hijack, or more
appropriately to Hayek, international human rights.” See Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and
Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 815, 816
(2002).
9. See, e.g., RHODA E. HOWARD-HASSMANN, CAN GLOBALIZATION PROMOTE HUMAN
RIGHTS? (2010); DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 1–3 (2009).
10. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948).

MOYN_BOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

150

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1/9/2015 12:33 AM

[Vol. 77:147
11

reflects understandable anger, it is also symptomatic of explanatory confusion.
Nonetheless, as David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy indicate in their
introduction to this issue, citing an inadequate shorthand for the complex of
individualist thought, market solutions, and state retrenchment both
domestically and internationally is better than omitting these topics altogether,
12
as American legal scholarship has so far done to its detriment.
But looking beyond America, the prominence of neoliberalism as a category
in scholarship about human rights means that the exact nature of the linkage of
the two requires as much attention as the omission of the former from thinking
about the latter. “Human rights, as with power and money, became a means to
an end of globalizing neoliberal democracy,” Stephen Hopgood remarks in his
13
much noticed recent study, in a commonplace observation. And yet, so far,
Marxists such as Wendy Brown, Susan Marks, and others have offered
indeterminate and unsubstantiated claims that do not suffice to plausibly
elevate the chronological coincidence of human rights and neoliberalism into a
factually plausible syndrome. For there is a long way from historical
“coincidence” or companionship—which there certainly has been between
neoliberalism and the human rights phenomenon—to actual causality and
complicity. “We would do well to take the measure of whether and how the
centrality of human rights discourse might render . . . other political possibilities
more faint,” Brown has argued in a classic indictment at the center of the recent
14
commentary. Even this displacement theory, about which Brown explicitly
invites further reflection rather than offering a strong conclusion, is weak
compared to the much stronger accusation of complicity that Brown and others
15
simultaneously offer.
Though it seems likely that some displacement of other schemes of justice
has indeed occurred thanks to the rise of human rights, I do not think a much
16
stronger claim is likely to work. To say that human rights were coincident with
or part of the context of neoliberal victory is not only not to say more—it is also
not to say much. In particular, it is not to say that neoliberalism has required
human rights to make its way in the world—or vice versa. Picayune an agenda
as it might seem to specify how weakly related the ascent of human rights
11. See, e.g., Keally McBride, Neoliberalism: Its Untimely Life and Timely Death, paper presented
at American Political Science Association annual conference, September 2013.
12. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 1.
13. STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 95 (2013).
14. Wendy Brown, “The Most We Can Hope For. . .”: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism,
103 S. ATLANTIC Q. 451, 461–62 (2004).
15. See id. In the same essay, though tentative about displacement, Brown claims that human
rights “legitimate” neoliberalism in the form of global free trade and engage in “an old ruse of liberal
reformers, in pursuing agendas that have significant effects in excess of the explicit reform, while
insist[ing] that all they are doing is a bit of good or holding back the dark.” Id. at 461.
16. The relationship between human rights and imperial agendas is a separate matter I do not take
up here, but my own view is that the case for intermittent causal relation is much stronger, for there is
no denying the role of moral claims in creating legitimacy for great powers (as well as other actors).
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appears to the market fundamentalism of our time, I suggest that the finding of
only a tenuous relationship between the two has substantial ramifications for
judging human rights and their spectacular rise in the last few decades—and
thus for assessing the mainstream position.
Excusing human rights from causally abetting the free market victory of the
neoliberal age is, after all, no defense of their prominence today. It is certainly
worth considering the possibility that human rights provide some sort of moral
leverage against neoliberal developments. However, even if the value of the
normative guidance that human rights provide is undoubted, the trouble is that
it amounts to little more than a set of mostly rhetorical admonitions. Worse, by
focusing on a minimum floor of human protection, human rights norms prove
inadequate in facing the reality that neoliberalism has damaged equality locally
and globally much more than it has basic human rights outcomes (which, in
some cases, it may indeed have advanced). It is hardly less distressing, but, so
far, much more justifiable to conclude that human rights have not made enough
of a difference in the short timeframe and global space they share with their
neoliberal frère ennemi. They have been condemned to watch but have been
powerless to deter. Added to the fact that human rights at least as canonically
established have nothing to say about the principal value of equality that
neoliberalism threatens, it seems hard to conclude that they are a useful
resource in response.
If my perspective in between Marxism and the mainstream is adequate, it
also follows that there is not much critical or political value in opposing human
rights out of understandable outrage at neoliberalism. Instead, the economic
transformations of the current era force a heavy burden on those concerned to
formulate or to find a more serious analytical account of economic
transformations and to offer more robust political resistance than they have
marshaled so far. And since human rights idioms, approaches, and movements
are unlikely to offer either—and, indeed, do not strive to do so when it comes to
inequality—they should stick to their minimalist tasks outside the
socioeconomic domain, in part to avoid drawing fire for abetting the stronger
companion of their historical epoch.
This article is structured to reach these conclusions by examining a range of
Marxist positions on the relationship between neoliberalism and human rights,
beginning with Karl Marx’s own theory of rights, both because of its intrinsic
importance of and its frequent application to current debates. After concluding
that this theory offers only initial starting points for analyzing international
human rights and the neoliberal era of capitalism alike, the article’s next part
turns to the late-twentieth-century history of the companionship of the two,
tracking their contemporaneous inceptions to examine their harmony and
dissonance. The final part of the article stresses that human rights offer a
minimum of protection where the real significance of neoliberalism has been to
obliterate the previous limitation of inequality. Although human rights idioms,
regimes, and movements have valuably formulated one approach to that floor,
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they have so far done little or nothing to build it, even as they have surged
discursively across the same era as the ceiling on hierarchy has been simply
blown away.
II
THE GARDEN OF EDEN OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN
It is worthwhile to begin by to establishing how much work would be
required—certainly far beyond that done so far—to regard human rights as an
apology for “neoliberal” capitalism, in part because of how much work Karl
Marx’s own texts leave to be done. And this is so for two overlapping sets of
reasons. For one thing, there were the different phases in Marx’s own account
of rights, which provide an inadvertent reminder of how institutionally new
international human rights today are. Second, there is massive distance between
the globalizing capitalism to which he bore witness and our world. Even if his
own work provides considerable resources for thinking about rights generally, it
falls silent when it comes to the specificities of our problem, both because of the
“neoliberal” form of our capitalism as well as the globalizing reformism of our
rights movements.
Marx, of course, offers his most famous criticism of “human rights” in On
the Jewish Question, where he takes the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and Citizen as an index of the failure of political emancipation compared
17
to the “human emancipation” for which he calls. Yet in this early text, Marx
usefully makes central (even if he fails to effectively theorize) what may have
been the central fact of the rights of man for most of their history: they have
18
long been constituted within the state. There is, of course, no doubt that the
political language of natural rights had an elective affinity, or an even deeper
relationship, with the birth and expansion of capitalist social relations, and
Marx eventually understood that the reduction of rights to his original statist
19
framework was misleading. Yet it remains of great interest that, in taking the
French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 as
his early prooftext, Marx believed that a moral philosophy of natural rights in
its most abstract formulations depends in history on the agency of the state
20
(even nation-state) to be politically operationalized. Marx did not take this

17. See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker
ed., 2d ed. 1978).
18. See id. at 23–24.
19. The classic argument is C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
20. Historians such as Richard Tuck have diagnosed a much deeper causal relationship than Marx
himself perceived between the ascendancy of rights in early modern natural law theory and the
perfection of modern state as the essential and long-term forum of their political meaning. See
RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT (2001). I followed Tuck’s general argument
somewhat slavishly in my own book in distinguishing international human rights. See Moyn, supra note
1, at ch.1.
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alliance to be a contingent mistake; to him, it was rather a core feature of the
rise of rights. Textually, to put it differently, Marx’s critique of human rights is a
critique of political emancipation within the state. If his critique is directed at the
formal abstraction of rights, then it is abstraction within a (rather institutionally
concrete and historically specific) forum of the political citizenship provided by
21
the state.
Marx’s insistence on the limits of the state as an agent of emancipation,
alongside his lack of interest in the state-making many have prized down
through the era of twentieth-century decolonization, should thus not distract
from the fact that his own framing of the significance of the rights of man in his
most classical treatment fails to link them to the workings of global capital.
Whether or not Marx’s critique transposes easily to the abstractions of rights in
moral philosophy, then, it definitely requires significant theoretical work—and
ultimately, a changed account from that early essay—to apply it to modern-day
international and global human rights politics. When they became a newly
prestigious mobilizational and legal option, international human rights politics
broke in fundamental ways with the statist framework within which Marx
himself worked and the institutionalized rights politics that he observed in the
French Revolution. If anything, the centrality of the state to bourgeois order
indeed meant that the response of working men had to be itself globalizing,
though certainly not in the mode of contemporary human rights activists.
None of this means that the entanglements of “human rights” and “modern
capitalism” (including “neoliberalism”) do not exist, but it does mean that they
are not obvious, even or especially for Marxists, who must build rather than
assume an account of them. And as much as Marx’s own theoretical evolution
after On the Jewish Question provides better grounds for success in this venture,
it also leaves severe obstacles. For one thing, it is also true, as recent research
has shown, that Marx himself was by no means above invoking rights as a basis
of progressive reform, in spite of his apparently totalistic rejection of them
22
before. Indeed, as Andrew Sartori emphasizes, the constitutive emancipatory
promise of liberalism and its rights talk as Marx understood both as much
authorized intermittent criticisms of capitalism (and empire) as obfuscated their
23
obvious depredations. But the real challenge is that Marx’s ultimate critique of
rights is general, going to the relation between the globalization of capital,
property ownership, and social abstraction, rather than anything so narrow and

21. That was why the response to a bourgeois regime of rights required the liquidation of the
distinction between the state and civil society, and though perhaps not what Engels later called the
“withering away” of the state.
22. See DAVID LEOPOLD, THE YOUNG KARL MARX: GERMAN PHILOSOPHY, MODERN
POLITICS, AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 150–63 (2009); Justine Lacroix & Jean-Yves Pranchère, Karl
Marx fut-il vraiment un opposant aux droits de l’homme?: Émancipation individuelle et théorie des
droits, 62 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 433 (2012) (both demonstrating Marx’s
deployment of rights talk for the sake of emancipation).
23. ANDREW SARTORI, LIBERALISM IN EMPIRE: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY (2014). I am very
grateful to Professor Sartori for assistance with this part of the article.
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particular as an analysis of international human rights regimes and movements
(which, if they existed in his time, did not interest him).
When he evolved beyond the juvenilia of On the Jewish Question, Marx
altered his presentation of bourgeois rights to moderate the statist emphasis of
his early account. But these theoretical shifts were really in the service of an
account emphasizing how a (potentially) globalizing set of market relations
required a set of social abstractions that might comfortably take formal
individual rights as its legal form. Hence Marx’s claim in Capital that the
capitalist market is
a very Eden of the innate rights of man. . . . [There individuals] contract as free
persons, who are equal before the law. Their contract is the final result in which their
joint will finds a common legal expression. . . . [E]ither in accordance with the preestablished harmony of things, or under the auspices of an omniscient providence,
they all work together
to their mutual advantage, for the common weal, and in the
24
common interest.

Yet even in the evolved form of Marx’s critique, there is a drastic set of
differences between that general account—which might fit, for example, the
modern globalization of markets and the globalization of property rights quite
well—and some specific account needed to capture the particularity of
25
international human rights regimes and movements in the last several decades.
After all, neoliberal capitalism is a specific episode in the history of
capitalism that Marx never knew. More important for my purposes here, today,
human rights are often self-consciously presented (though not with great
plausibility, as I ultimately argue) as a force that can or will moderate or even
reverse the evils of the current form of global market relations. Stereotypically,
and to some extent really, human rights legal orders and mobilizational politics
have lost their associations to the defense of freedom of contract and private
property—there are other bodies of law, and other movements, for that
purpose. Rather, in human rights regimes from the United Nations processes to
treaty mechanisms, and in human rights movements from Amnesty
International to global antipoverty campaigns, the goal is to ameliorate the
suffering of others or even insist upon the basis for justified, though minimal,
redistribution. Whatever one wants to say about human rights as they exist
today, in short, must depart radically from Marx’s early work, and build

24. 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 280 (Ben Fowkes trans.,
1976).
25. As Marx’s own treatments imply, appeal to natural and human rights remained more common
in his own era as cited rationales for the protection of free contract and private property. In fact
neoliberals today refer much more rarely to the justificatory basis of natural or human rights than their
nineteenth-century forebears did in defense of their economic liberalism, presumably because
reformists and humanitarians have so successfully captured the language for their cause. Compare
ROBERT GREEN MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 1865–1910,
ch.5 (1951) (entitled “Judicial Conservatism and the Rights of Man”), with Samuel Moyn, Nationalism
and Capitalism as Nineteenth-Century Rights Movements, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS
HISTORY (Devin O. Pendas ed., forthcoming) (both demonstrating the popularity of libertarian rights
talk in the nineteenth century).
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substantially on his later work. And though Marx could not have theorized
either neoliberalism or human rights as they are now known, he might not have
been surprised to learn that the chief objection to the latter is that they share
the same historical era as the former without unsettling it.
III
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NEOLIBERAL ECONOMICS: HARMONY AND
DISSONANCE
Although the broad outlines of the emergence of neoliberalism have been
and continue to be the subject of an accelerating and exciting literature, in the
final analysis the origins are fairly straightforward. As the prospect of state-led
growth and redistribution loomed in the middle of the twentieth century,
Friedrich Hayek and his initially obscure compatriots, offering a complex
revival of nineteenth-century economic liberalism, linked the emergence of the
Western welfare state to the communist planned economy (even though, in fact,
the leaders of welfare states were about to enter a bitter global struggle with
their communist opposite numbers). Thirty years later, in the midst of the
1970s, the neoliberals suddenly and surprisingly found in the economic crisis of
26
the welfarist project an opening for their views. The rest of neoliberalism’s
history since that breakthrough moment is well-known: the evisceration of the
regulatory state in the North Atlantic industrial zone together with an
international program towards the global south (as well as, perhaps most
spectacularly, formerly communist Eastern Europe) to facilitate capital
27
movement to the detriment of opposing forces. Strikingly, this barebones
narrative has numerous parallelisms to the history of the emergence of human
rights. After all, human rights also revive a version of classical liberalism in new
form. Intellectually, international human rights were not new in the 1970s but
enjoyed new practical circumstances in the middle of that decade that made
them prestigious overnight. And during the 1970s (as well as today), the
premier target of international human rights politics was (and continues to be)
the postcolonial and developmentalist state. These coincidences seem to be (in
the Marxist phrase) “no accident.”

26. See ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE
DEPRESSION (2012).
27. On intellectual foundations, aside from BURGIN, supra note 26, see SERGE AUDIER, NÉOLIBÉRALISMES: UNE ARCHÉOLOGIE INTELLECTUELLE (2012). To date the general histories of
neoliberalism are surprisingly intellectual, and nothing comparably synthetic exists on enacted policies
of the 1970s and since. But for early pictures and building blocks, see DAVID HARVEY, THE ROAD
FROM MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE (Diethelm
Plehwe & Philip Mirowski, eds., 2009); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM
(2005); see also JOHANNA BOCKMAN, MARKETS IN THE NAME OF SOCIALISM: THE LEFT-WING
ORIGINS OF NEOLIBERALISM (2011); COLIN LEYS, MARKET-DRIVEN POLITICS: NEOLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2003); JAMIE PECK, CONSTRUCTIONS OF NEOLIBERAL
REASON (2013). For the response to recent capitalist setbacks, with heavy emphasis on the economics
profession (rather than structural forces), see PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS GO
TO WASTE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM SURVIVED THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2013).
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The most plausible explanation for these facts is that human rights and
neoliberalism shared both a predecessor and a target: a developmentalist
statism that, while certainly present in the welfarist west and north, found its
most famous expressions in Eastern Europe and the global south. Put
differently, the paired breakthroughs of human rights and neoliberalism shared
common institutional foes and especially negative conditions as those foes lost
prestige. A national welfarist commitment found across the North Atlantic,
normally defended in collectivist terms, was on the wane just as human rights
and neoliberalism began enjoying success, and the same was even more true of
the developmentalist vocation of the postcolonial nation-state to prioritize rapid
growth, often by pursuing economic autarky. Without their departure, it seems
hard to imagine that either international human rights or neoliberal frameworks
and policies would have begun their rapid ascent in the mid-1970s, which gave
them a kindred trajectory against a shared prior background.
Furthermore, neoliberalism and human rights share key ideological building
blocks. Most obviously, they share a commitment to the prime significance of
the individual, whose freedoms matter more than collectivist endeavors, even
when those are justified on the grounds that they will generally advance the
well-being of individuals. More controversially, their shared antipathy towards,
or at least suspicion of, the state, and especially the nation-state, also seems
plain, since both reject its moral credentials (even as both rely on its agency for
enacting policy reform).
Though clearly neoliberalism and human rights share several negative
conditions and ideological building blocks, the question is whether these
common traits obscure much more than they reveal about the causal
interdependence of the two phenomena—or, more accurately, lack thereof.
After all, the general affinities of human rights with market fundamentalism
only go so far. To state the obvious, for human rights’ many partisans, they are
a discourse of hope and reform and have typically been directed at the
totalitarian and authoritarian state. That state persists in many places today, in
response to which human rights advocates continue to engage in their
informational politics without any conscious commitment to a particular scheme
of economic relations (or perhaps more accurately, with a conscious though
frequently separate commitment to unspecified visions of social justice). The
ongoing critique of the atrocity, despotism, and misrule of the state in which the
human rights movement overwhelmingly engages hardly amounts to a grim
recipe for rollback of the national welfare state and could not possibly entail
that rollback on its own.
And so, very quickly in the assessment of how human rights have tracked
the emergence of a neoliberal age, one is pushed onto the ground of troubling
chronological simultaneity, negative conditions, and vague descriptive affinity.
All of these perhaps authorize suspicions of weak complicity, but hardly of
more dastardly synergy, between neoliberalism and human rights. And in spite
of these parallelisms between the two phenomena, it is an altogether different
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matter whether the moment of success in the 1970s that each enjoyed depended
on the success of the other. There are, in fact, many reasons to doubt that this is
the case.
With their scalar novelty as global principles informing a transnational
political movement, human rights were resurrected under very specific
circumstances from their entombment in obscure United Nations documents
and procedures (including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
itself and the international supervision some envisaged on its basis). There were
three great causal factors that led to their dissemination outside the United
Nations: (1) the loss of faith in Cold War paradigms of personal engagement
(and notably the loss of faith in socialism) in favor of a new and putatively
“antipolitical” sort of movement; (2) the rise of human rights as a language of
state legitimacy in the international system, surprisingly sponsored first and
foremost by American Presidents along with some West European leaders; and
(3) the achievement of decolonization, which, from Western capitals, often
seemed to cry out for a new form of rights-based international supervision that
28
suddenly seemed relevant.
For one episode that suggests that the coincidence of the parallel
breakthrough of neoliberalism with the emergence of international human
rights politics may explain little, consider the example of the southern cone of
the Americas after 1973. Notoriously, General Augusto Pinochet, after his fall
1973 coup, adopted Milton Friedman as an adviser, and the neoliberal Mont
Pèlerin Society held meetings in Chile. Indeed, Naomi Klein takes this example
29
as the starting point in her history of neoliberal “shock.” In a very brief section
of her book, the most popular history of neoliberalism ever written, Klein takes
up how human rights imposed “blinders” on the relationship between
30
capitalism and terror. Instead, she rightly says, Amnesty International took a
neutral attitude toward structural matters (like the class struggle and ongoing
counterrevolution Marxists saw) in order to focus on an informational politics
31
that merely singled out incontestable state abuses. Marks agrees that “where
the effects of neo-liberal reconstruction began to bite, activists confined their
criticism to the denunciation of abuses, leaving unchallenged the conditions in
32
which those abuses had become possible.”
But although it is true (indeed, centrally important) that the coalescence of
a new sort of transnational-rights movement in response to Latin American
misdeeds confined itself to state crimes, it is important to be clear about what is
28. See Moyn, supra note 1. For even more factors, see also Jan Eckel, The Rebirth of Politics from
the Spirit of Morality: Explaining the Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s, in THE BREAKTHROUGH:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 1970S 226 (Jan Eckel & Samuel Moyn eds., 2013). On the American case, see
BARBARA J. KEYS, RECLAIMING AMERICAN VIRTUE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION OF THE
1970S 75–152 (2014).
29. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 7.
30. Id. at 118–21.
31. Id. at 118–19.
32. Marks, supra note 1, at 9.
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and is not being said. No one asserts that this early instance of a now-familiar
sort of informational activism was a cause of either the coups themselves or the
disarmament of other sorts of criticism against the misdeeds of Pinochet’s
33
government or other new authoritarian regimes. Klein, unlike Marks, registers
clearly why, if contributory blame falls on human rights optics, it is really only
with regard to the regime’s external critics—for, at that point in history, its
internal opponents had no choice but to narrow their focus and ignore the
political economy of state terror. Klein writes, “Every facet of the human rights
movement was functioning under highly restricted circumstances . . . Inside the
affected countries . . . they didn’t talk about the political or economic agendas
behind the disappearances because to do so was to risk being disappeared
34
themselves.” Klein could have added that the coalescence of a transnational
human rights movement, for all the price that movement paid in muting
structural critique, functioned in coalitional ways quite differently from a more
divisive revolutionary politics. But it remains true that the international left was
alive and well, and part of the success of human rights in the 1970s was due to
the left’s own failure either to escape savage repression in a range of countries
or to successfully bring together a coalition to denounce dictatorial misdeeds
with equal success as human rights movements. It is true that Klein concludes
that “the human rights movement also helped the Chicago School ideology to
35
escape from its first bloody laboratory virtually unscathed.” Yet the blame it
deserves in this regard seems rather negligible compared to a host of other
forces—including failures and mistakes on the left at what remained a very
open moment in history. Further, as Klein acknowledges, the human rights
“movement unquestionably played a decisive role in forcing an end to the
36
junta’s worst abuses.”
As for the rest of Klein’s book, which proceeds through the present,
nowhere else does it mention human rights movements (except to rely serially
on their information in order to frame her critique). And in any case, much
more interesting than a debatable causal linkage between neoliberalism and
human rights in the 1970s is the two movements’ ongoing companionship as
they both entered adolescence in the 1980s and achieved close to full capture of
their respective realms of governance, both on national and international
scenes, in the 1990s. Even as the transnational left remained alive and well in
the 1970s across the world, in the 1980s and 1990s (and indeed, through today)
human rights frameworks came and continue to come close to occupying the

33. One would need a much more intricate story to make the latter case, of the sort attempted (to
my knowledge) only in the case of Uruguayan exiles after the coup in their own country in the summer
of 1973, and the substitutional story about their peregrinations towards human rights as opposed to
inherited leftism took long into the later decades. See VANIA MARKARIAN, LEFT IN
TRANSFORMATION: URUGUAYAN EXILES AND THE LATIN AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORKS,
1967–1984 67–106 (2005).
34. Klein, supra note 1, at 149.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 147.
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imagination of reformist-minded individuals and groups the world over—and
thus deserve much larger causal association with a range of phenomena. (If
there has been “social resilience” in the face of various neoliberal successes
worth emphasizing, the left has not fared as well, in practice and perhaps in
37
theory too. )
And yet it remains a completely open research question how exactly to
frame the relationship of the human rights explosion with neoliberal victory, in
Latin America and especially beyond. Was it the same everywhere and all
along? I do not think so, for the allegation that human rights silenced structural
and “political” criticisms of what amounted to a neoliberal era became much
more valid and convincing only as time went on. But there is still the work to
accomplish to say even that much. As Mary Nolan cautiously and insightfully
puts it, “There is no single relationship between human rights and market
38
fundamentalism across countries and types of rights.” The same observation
applies across time. The history of the initially distant companionship remains
to be written.
To me, it already seems clear that a better way to frame the relationship
between neoliberalism and human rights, at least based on current research, is
in terms of parallel trajectories, with the tragic consequence that (as some of
Marks’s own brilliant work implies) structural insight into the root causes of
39
social suffering went missing at the time that it was badly needed. Yet this
result occurred only in small part because human rights became a more
coalitionally successful prism for interpreting and addressing injustice than
other imaginable frameworks. It is possible (as I have argued in The Last
Utopia) for the prestige and prominence of international human rights to be
symptomatic of a loss of structural accounts of social relations without their
40
being causally responsible or morally culpable for it. If such modes of thought
have been lacking due to the “superficiality” of the informational focus of
human rights politics, it is not as if those politics are alone or even primarily to
blame. The failure of a convincing structuralism and the programmatic aphasia
that resulted is the work of many forces, and it is implausible to believe that
either has gone missing thanks primarily to human rights hegemony.
If all of the above holds—and one assumes that historical coincidence is not
necessarily a causal relationship—then the analysis becomes much less one
about blame (or excusal) and much more about the failure of structural modes

37. See SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA (Peter A. Hall & Michèle Lamont eds.,
2013).
38. Mary Nolan, Human Rights and Market Fundamentalism in the Long 1970s, in TOWARDS A
NEW MORAL WORLD ORDER: MENSCHENRECHTSPOLITIK UND VÖLKERRECHT SEIT 1945 172, 174
(Norbert Frei & Annette Weinke eds., 2013). The essay is a promissory note for a major research
project that is intended to spell out the relationship in careful detail. See also Mary Nolan, Gender and
Utopian Visions in a Post-utopian Era: Americanism, Human Rights, Market Fundamentalism, 44 CENT.
EUR. HIST. 13 (2011).
39. See Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2011).
40. See Moyn, supra note 1.

MOYN_BOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

160

1/9/2015 12:33 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 77:147

of thinking and more activist political strategies to retain widespread appeal.
Human rights look more like a symptom of a much broader syndrome, and the
point of criticizing them changes accordingly. It becomes about convincing their
adherents that, although serviceable for some tasks (like singling out state
abuses), human rights fail at others, and need to be supplemented by both new
frameworks of analysis and new modes of intra- and transnational activism.
IV
THE FAILURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOCIOECONOMIC DOMAIN
In his classic A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Marxist David Harvey is
surprisingly generous to the birth of human rights, though he is well positioned
to see early on that it coincided with the trajectory of his own object of study.
He notes:
The universalism of rights has been and can be used with progressive aims in minds.
The tradition that is most spectacularly represented by Amnesty International,
Médecins sans frontières, and others cannot be dismissed as a mere adjunct of
neoliberal thinking. The whole history of humanism (both of the Western—classically
41
liberal—and various non-Western versions) is too complicated for that.

And in spite of various criticisms of human rights that are easily made—
their limitation to first-generation liberties, their cooptation by imperial
projects, their nondemocratic credentials even when intervention abroad takes
nonmilitary form, or their elitist distance from grassroots politics—Harvey
concludes it is a mistake to dismiss them. Instead of “eschew[ing] all appeal to
universals as fatally flawed” and “abandon[ing] all mention of rights as an
untenable imposition of abstract, market-based ethics as a mask for the
restoration of class power,” in the end it would be “unfortunate to abandon the
field of rights to neoliberal hegemony. There is a battle to be fought, not only
over which universals and what rights should be invoked in particular situations
but also over how universal principles and conceptions of rights should be
42
constructed.”
However, that hypothetical apology for some version of universalism or
even some version of human rights should not lead to complacency. It cannot
substitute for an inquiry into how much of a difference that the actual, so-farenacted forms of universalistic human rights law and policy have made—
notably with respect to the economic arrangements that neoliberalism has
43
transformed. In this regard, a harsh and unforgiving verdict on international
human rights politics seems necessary in order to stave off sentimental hopes
and to promote intellectual commitments and practical mobilization that will do
better. If the human rights movement is the weak and subordinate
doppelgänger of its neoliberal brother—with whom it is joined in a mysterious

41. Harvey, supra note 27, at 178.
42. Id. at 178–79.
43. See Samuel Moyn, Do Human Rights Treaties Make Enough of a Difference?, in CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Conor Gearty & Costas Douzinas eds., 2012).
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common destiny but merely dragged along without providing direction—then
some other sort of opposition is necessary in both the short and long run.
Recently, empirical political scientists have adopted the goal of verifying
whether human rights law makes any difference—that is to say, whether it leads
to any positive outcomes. In my view, the language of human rights has worked
well in robbing legitimacy from certain extreme regime forms, although it is
highly controversial whether human rights law actually played a causal role in
the political transformation in the former Soviet bloc, Latin American
autocracies, and elsewhere. And, in any event, any study of the uses of human
rights law needs to incorporate attention to its misuses. Skeptical of the human
rights mobilization across borders, leading empirical analyst Beth Simmons has
argued plausibly that, where the political and material circumstances of modern
citizenship already exist, human rights law allows an additional tool of domestic
mobilization, beyond even that made available by constitutional law, at least
when it comes to norms like freedom of speech and integrity of the human
44
body. Harvey’s optimism about the emancipatory possibilities of rightsclaiming is most plausible in these cases. However, empirical political scientists
so far provide no case so far for the productive uses of human rights norms
regarding economic and social entitlements. It is indeed remarkable that
Simmons, Kathryn Sikkink, and others who hope to redeem human rights from
cynicism about their negligible effects have so far focused exclusively on some
rights to the detriment of others—especially rights purporting to afford
protections in the socioeconomic domain.
A brief, and therefore necessarily superficial, survey of the shortcomings of
human rights norms and movements with the structural transformations of the
era of market fundamentalism in mind must start with a basic and rarely made
point: In their legalized forms, human rights do not purport to provide an
egalitarian agenda. It is perfectly possible to imagine a fully achieved local and
global regime of human rights protection that simultaneously features the worst
hierarchy of wealth and other primary goods known to history. Indeed, in some
ways, grasping the paradoxical relationship of human rights and so-called
neoliberalism amounts to seeing how thorough a disjuncture there is between
an agenda of economic and social rights protection and a more ambitious
45
egalitarian agenda. When it comes to the sorts of goals envisioned by the
International Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, it is not how
much they promise but how little that needs to receive more emphasis, since the
covenant strives for a minimum floor of protection in domains like housing,

44. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 151–71 (2011).
45. For a less oppositional view that nonetheless recognizes the different vocations of (canonically
established) economic rights and theories of overall social justice, see Jeremy Waldron, Socioeconomic
Rights and Theories of Justice (New York University School of Law Public Law and Research Paper
Series
Working
Paper
No.
10-79,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1699898.
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health, and food, rather than a fuller bodied egalitarianism.
It is popular, and understandable, to focus on those episodes (Pinochet’s
Chile, for example) where neoliberal policies have gone along with state
repression—which Klein’s indictment of the shock doctrine dramatizes (or
sensationalizes). But, in certain ways, it seems much more disturbing to observe
that neoliberal victories are perfectly compatible with full respect for not just
civil and political liberties, but also for economic and social rights. If one
extrapolates the most extreme possible illustration of this point, it is perfectly
possible to imagine an alternate reality in which one man personally owns
everything, but with all the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights nonetheless honored (through his subsistence spending). Even the
much-ridiculed promise in the Universal Declaration’s Article 27 of paid
vacations is completely harmonious with a world controlled by a galloping
46
hierarchy of means. Society has indeed headed towards a scenario in the last
thirty years where a formerly egalitarian impulse has sometimes successfully
been displaced, as inequality has spiked, by an agenda in which a set of
protections alleviates the most abject destitution. Generalizing drastically, it is
fair to say that the present era of world history is one in which a floor has been
partially built to save the wretched of the earth from the worst suffering, even
47
as the ceiling for hierarchical wealth concentration has been obliterated.
The conceptual point, in other words, is that an economic and social rights
agenda is different—and much more minimalist—than an egalitarian agenda. It
is perfectly possible for one to succeed as the other fails. The historical point is
that the ends of the first agenda have often been prioritized—and sometimes
achieved—across an era during which the ends of the second agenda have been
forsaken. But two crucial qualifications are necessary to understand the
historically juxtaposed trajectories of the two agendas. For one thing, for all the
progress made in saving humanity from the most extreme sorts of immiseration,
much remains to be done even to provide a floor of basic protection. No one
wants to trivialize social and economic rights protection, even in the name of a
plausible indictment of aphasia concerning broader patterns of wealth and
income distribution and rising inequality. Second, even successes in the
socioeconomic domain have hardly been due to the application of a normative
framework of human rights, the birth of a formal regime of human rights law, or
the mobilizational activism of any human rights movement. In fact, the lion’s
share of poverty reduction in the last few decades (indeed, given the population
numbers involved, in world history by far) is due to a single factor: the policies
48
of the Chinese state. And although a wide range of factors account for the

46. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10.
47. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
48. According to one source, China brought more than 600 million people out of poverty across
the era of neoliberalism (1980–2010), accounting for three-quarters of all poverty reduction worldwide.
See Towards the End of Poverty, THE ECONOMIST, June 1, 2013, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21578665-nearly-1-billion-people-have-been-taken-out-
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remainder of poverty reduction—food and water access, health improvement,
and so on—it does not seem as if human rights protection or promotion as
frameworks or projects rank high among them, if they figure on the list at all.
Now consider this deflationary perspective about the value of economic and
social rights agendas (set off from the protection of those rights achieved
through other frameworks or thanks to other means) by starting with domestic
or national protection and then turning to more transnational and global
protection. There is no doubt that, after the first phase of human rights history
in the 1970s and 1980s, during which a global dialogue concerning economic and
social rights was largely absent, such discourse has surged. But, sadly, this
rhetorical and framing (or, more generously, standard-setting) work has caused
no shifts in real-world outcomes independently. This is most graphically clear
when it comes to the highly prestigious model of judicial enforcement of
socioeconomic rights, especially when national judiciaries interpret
constitutional norms in the spirit of international human rights law (including
by relying on its notion of a minimum core of protection).
For many years, South Africa was credited as the laboratory where these
49
developments were pioneered, especially after the landmark Grootboom case.
In particular, for several years, some leading American academics praised the
“democracy-forcing” manner in which South African courts both advanced
socioeconomic rights and respected democratic legitimacy when it came to
50
policy choices. On this interpretation, courts could invalidate policies that
failed to respect a designated minimum core of socioeconomic rights protection
while refusing to craft enforcement remedies of their own, thereby prompting
51
democratic branches of government to do so. But, especially on this minimalist
and noninterventionist model, the final results have been disappointing: it turns
out that the South African judiciary, instead of encouraging legislative or
political action, forced the democratic branches into a nonresponse.
Unfortunately, it is plausible to conclude that judicial enforcement has failed to
52
make a great deal of difference, both in South Africa and beyond. In
particular, as David Landau has shown, enforcement of economic rights by
courts tend to favor the well-off (such as pensioners defending entitlements
against state rollback under budgetary pressure) rather than the weakest and

extreme-poverty-20-years-world-should-aim.
49. See Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others 2001
(1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Af.) (vindicating social and economic rights of applicants and encouraging
government policy to implement them).
50. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 221–38 (2001);
MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE
RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW chs. 6–8 (2009).
51. See Sunstein, supra note 50. It is a story that likely seemed especially appealing to Americans
because of their own country’s failure to constitutionalize social rights at the zenith of liberal judicial
power and persistent worries since of the political power of the charge that judges might “legislate from
the bench.”
52. See Paul O’Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic Rights, 74 MOD. L. REV. 532 (2011).
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53

most vulnerable. Of course, the failure of judicial enforcement of
socioeconomic rights does not mean that other attempts to protect
socioeconomic rights have necessarily failed. But, so far, there is no powerful
evidence confirming the value that a human rights framework brings to the
reformulation of citizenship in a welfarist direction thanks to other forces (for
example, partisan mobilization, which Simmons has credited for improvement
54
when it comes to political and civil rights).
Meanwhile, in international law, there is currently a burgeoning debate
about how international human rights norms do or might tame or counteract
globalization, especially in its recent neoliberal mode. This debate has exploded
in two concurrent arenas: international trade law and policy on the one hand
and corporate social responsibility on the other. But the most generous thing to
say is that it is too early for much more than the declaration of normative
applicability of human rights principles in either domain.
Petersmann and many others have argued that, by and large, the
relationship between globalization and human rights is essentially one of
mutual reinforcement or even common identity, especially when rights of
property and free enterprise are made the key to the enjoyment of other human
goods since property rights and free enterprise allow the funding for these other
55
goods to materialize. The more that free trade is allowed to maximize wealth
for all, the better the outcomes will be across all dimensions of concern that
human rights aim to cover. The response of mainstream human rights scholars
to this claim is to insist on the separability and priority of the norms of which
they are the stewards, guarding them against being falsely represented as simple
56
side effects or fringe benefits of some other project, like economic growth.
Although optimists in the mainstream continue to hold out hope for “linkage”
in the trade arena and the rise of rights principles within corporate social
responsibility, it is hard to conclude that the grounds for hope are justified on
57
the basis of the record so far.
In perhaps the most developed version of this mainstream account, David
Kinley has argued that if globalization is tweaked in the name of external
international human rights standards that it sometimes regrettably fails to
respect, it can indeed provide the benefits that its more naïve enthusiasts

53. See David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 401 (2011).
54. See Simmons, supra note 44.
55. See Petersmann, supra note 6.
56. See Alston, supra note 8.
57. Petersmann has made much clearer in response to the polemics of a decade ago that he does
not regard “linkage” of human rights and trade liberalization to be solely on the latter’s terms, thus
making his proximity to mainstream optimists about the possibility of finding a zone of overlap
between capitalism and human rights (and vice versa) clearer than before. See Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, The Promise of Linking Human Rights and Trade, in LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS:NEW POLICY SPACE IN HARD ECONOMIC TIMES (Daniel Drache & Lesley A. Jacobs
eds., 2014).
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58

celebrate as automatic. His position is that, if the equally regrettable extremes
of uncritical partisanship and skeptical demonization of globalizing markets are
avoided, the large amount of overlap between market forces and human rights
can be discovered and “crossovers and complementarities” between the two
59
maximized. For Kinley and others writing in this vein, neoliberal market
fundamentalists are bad apples who inappropriately extend their otherwise
healthy respect for the ability of free trade and multinational corporations to
raise humanity out of indigence, and transform this respect into the mistaken
beliefs that there are no defects to globalizing capital and that all human goods
are advanced by it. Conversely, critics of “neoliberalism” refuse to see that
60
globalization has progressive features and believe that it is purely evil. With a
prophylaxis against the extremes, the task of ethical globalization is where hope
for the future lies.
Yet just as in the case of social rights prospectively enforced by judicial
authority, it is unsurprising that in both international trade law and corporate
social responsibility, human rights have proved distressingly ineffective, and this
61
seems unlikely to change. To be sure, human rights have made discursive
inroads, albeit surprisingly recently, in the trade debate. As late as 2006, when
World Trade Organization (WTO) Director-General Pascal Lamy offered a call
in Santiago to move beyond the Washington Consensus, human rights did not
62
figure into the discussion. But, then again, the raft of criticism of the
63
Washington Consensus before that date rarely appealed to human rights. (It
more frequently insisted that trade arrangements pay developmental benefits
for the worst off rather than that they respect human rights.) With surprising
speed, however, the intersection of international trade and human rights has
taken on something of the character of an obligatory topic in WTO circles, and
it seems plausible (though, as noted above, no one has undertaken to prove it
empirically) that, in the areas of labor regulation and pharmaceutical patents,
human rights have had some salutary effects in framing claims and even in
promoting better outcomes.
But it is another matter to hypothesize much of a general reorientation of
trade law by international human rights norms, law, or politics. Even
mainstream analysts acknowledge that human rights norms have made little
rhetorical headway in trade debates, and although the WTO’s dispute
resolution mechanism has teeth, it is not a plausible agent for the general
64
advancement of human rights outcomes. Andrew Lang’s brilliant essay on
58. See Kinley, supra note 9.
59. Id. at 32.
60. See Howard-Hassman, supra note 9.
61. See ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wolfgang Benedek et al. eds., 2011)
(providing survey of the human rights prospects in diverse areas of economic law).
62. See Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Organization, Humanising Globalisation
(Santiago, Chile, Jan. 30, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl16_e.htm.
63. See id.
64. According to Kinley, “I have lost count of the number of trade specialists (lawyers,
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neoliberal trade law sympathetically considers what would work, compared to
recent history, in which human rights have provided little beyond discursive
65
sensitization. Lang convincingly worries that it is only a reform of the
collective purposes of the trade regime itself that would provide better
normative guidance (and, one might add, more robust politicization both in
66
theory and practice). A focus on the effect of trade on human rights law from
the outside, as it were, has the function
of occluding the question of collective purpose in the conduct of international
economic governance. Where critical voices should be generating a debate about the
fundamental purposes of global trade governance, instead they have given rise to a
discussion of the relative priority to be accorded to the trade project vis-à-vis other
projects of international order. What should be a debate about re-opening space for
discussing the collective purposes of global trade governance, instead has to a large
extent become a debate about the appropriate allocation of authority between the
global trade regime and other centres of regulatory and political authority [like human
rights law]. . . . [A]ttempts to integrate consideration of ‘social’ values and objectives
into the trade regime are unlikely to bear much fruit unless they are accompanied by a
much more fundamental challenge to prevailing understandings of the nature and
67
purpose of the trade regime.

Lang himself casts this possible move as a return to the “embedded”
liberalism of the immediate post–World War II years, and he thinks human
rights are potentially part of the normative vocabulary that would provide this
68
return or renewal. Whether or not he is persuasive on either count, it seems
hard to doubt his conclusion that the superficiality of the effects of human rights
politics on trade outcomes so far demands some other approach.
Similar observations apply to corporate social responsibility, which has a
history that is even shorter with regard to the incorporation of human rights
norms, but which is subject to a parallel analysis as that of international trade
law. Indeed, the rise of human rights in the governance of corporations
(especially among multinational corporations) is not only more recent but has
come about in explicitly nonlegal, “moral” form. Famously, after the death of
the U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, John Ruggie
stepped in as special representative to offer “pragmatic” and nonlegal Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, approved by the Human Rights
69
Council in 2011. Charitably, it is far too early for optimism about the
economists, national and international bureaucrats, and academics) who roll their eyes whenever
mention is made of human rights and trade.” KINLEY, supra note 9, at 91. On dispute resolution, see
JAMES HARRISON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (2006).
65. See ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011).
66. Id. at 190–220.
67. Id. at 10–11. However, Lang, I believe, goes too far in saying that a human rights strategy is
“inadvertently complicit in the basic neoliberal move of occluding” collective purpose—unless it could
be shown that human rights seriously obstruct it, as opposed to distract from or simply fail to reach it.
68. Id. at 313–54.
69. John Gerard Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc.
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meaningful chastening of corporations simply because of the existence of these
principles, especially given the step away from legality (and sometimes rights
themselves) that Ruggie controversially took in order make consent toward
them possible.
As a general matter, mainstream proponents of human rights mechanisms in
the socioeconomic domain place faith in what one might call an “infiltrative”
model of politics, in which what is introduced as apparently harmless subterfuge
will end up creating conditions for a powerful threat. But Ruggie’s principles
seem even less likely to change behavior than other generally empty Trojan
horses that the human rights movement has built across its short history. Of
course, this hardly implies that the new principles are worthless—let alone so
accommodating as to provide collusive shelter to global corporate power. Time
alone will tell if they transcend their current uselessness, but it is not a good bet.
In an era when human rights chiefly have a rhetorical value in international
trade and corporate responsibility alike, the main effect they do risk is a
compensatory one, even as the chief practical challengers of neoliberalism, from
the Seattle protests against the WTO of 1999 to Occupy Wall Street fifteen
years later, generally skirt the normative claims, legal regimes, and
mobilizational strategies of human rights in favor of other rubrics and styles. As
Lang puts it,
it is important not to overstate the extent to which human rights have been adopted
more broadly as the language of the global justice movement. For every NGO that
adopts a rights perspective or uses rights language, there
are many more which do not,
70
and still more who do so only partially or tangentially.

Alas, this does not mean that anyone is, as of yet, in possession of a
plausible framework of opposition to market fundamentalism, either
intellectually or practically. But this hardly makes human rights necessary or
inevitable as a means of reorienting economic affairs, especially given their
failures to change the world so far.
IV
CONCLUSION: FORMS OF CRITICISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Whatever the obscure prehistories of international human rights and global
neoliberalism were up until the 1970s, when both began to ascend in
prominence, each of these phenomena enjoyed only minor successes until the
era surrounding the end of the Cold War, which provided each an extraordinary
space of opportunity. The World Conference on Human Rights, which took
place in Vienna in 1993, provided a moment of imaginative relaunching of

A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011). See also John Gerard Ruggie, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013).
70. Lang, supra note 65, at 100 (rigorously cataloguing the rise of human rights in trade debates
after the catalytic period of 1997–2000, particularly around the TRIPS agreement). Cf. Tomer Broude,
From Seattle to Occupy: The Shifting Focus of Global Protest, in LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 91 (2014).
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human rights corresponding to the founding of the WTO in 1995. The trouble is
that so far—and in contrast to their signal role in targeting and stigmatizing
totalitarian and authoritarian states—human rights have remained chiefly
rhetorical in their inroads into the socioeconomic domain, whereas
neoliberalism has transformed the globe profoundly. More challengingly, even
when it comes to the ends of human rights protection, neoliberalism has
sometimes done a better job than actual human rights movements: even as
neoliberalism has had disastrous effects on wealth distribution both within
states and across the globe, it has provided more poverty reduction, especially
in its Chinese form, than any other agent. (This is not to say that neoliberalism
unerringly works for the benefit of all humanity, as some of its proponents
claim).
In part for this reason, marginal skeptics about the role of human rights in
the global economy reply to mainstream optimists that the tweaks they
entertain to the international economic order are not enough. According to
skeptics, the mainstream is too uncritical of globalization itself to be trusted
with the task of separating the wheat from the chaff. The mainstream puts a
high premium on successfully avoiding naïve celebration of market
fundamentalism, but puts an only slightly modified version of that same set of
commitments in its place. For Paul O’Connell, there is no way to save
globalization from neoliberalism without the drastic transformation of politics
71
and economics that he calls “subaltern globalization.” Susan Marks, for her
part, focuses on the way in which human rights law, even when it purports to
seek root causes of human rights violations, is not currently organized to permit
the sort of structural critique eventually needed to target neoliberalism—or
72
perhaps capitalism in any of its possible variants. A new approach to politics
and law would require a systemic evaluation of the causes of and alternatives to
73
“planned misery.” In their current forms at least, international human rights
generally provide a distraction from both the necessary diagnosis and the
74
necessary remedy.
Although it is hard to gainsay the sobering conclusions of such critics, I have
been concerned in this article with a cautionary point. For it is equally hard to
conclude that blaming human rights regimes and movements of “complicity”
with neoliberalism is itself productive. As I have indicated, I do not think
human rights do or should provide the final normative standards against which
economic arrangements should be judged wanting: they are too minimalistic to
do so, especially in the socioeconomic domain, where an egalitarian theory of

71. Paul O’Connell, On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-liberal Globalisation and Human Rights,
7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 493–95 (2007). See also Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Reply, 9 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 127 (2009); Paul O’Connell, Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 135 (2009).
72. See Marks, supra note 39.
73. Id.
74. See Marks, supra note 1.

MOYN_BOOKPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2014]

1/9/2015 12:33 AM

A POWERLESS COMPANION

169
75

social justice provides a more defensible (and much higher) bar to meet. But
the minimalist standards of judgment for gross failure that human rights norms
offer hardly themselves pose an obstruction (let alone the main one) to
maximalist alternatives. The ethical standards of human rights are not
necessarily “part of the problem” in the quest to develop either a higher
standard for judgment or the political basis for a movement to meet it. The
same, mutatis mutandis, is true of human rights regimes and movements. But
this defense of human rights in an age of galloping inequality is obviously faint
76
praise.
It also follows that criticizing either the norms or the movements for
distraction and insufficiency is important but minimal in itself. In an era in
which human rights norms and movements are frequently overloaded with
expectation, the best conclusion is that a Band-Aid is not an adequate response
to a charnelhouse (even if Band-Aids have their uses). Analytically and
politically, the mere act of criticizing human rights does little to provide useful
alternatives to human rights frameworks, regimes, and movements that might
succeed in areas where human rights have failed—in part because human rights
are (so far) not designed to succeed in those areas. To bring the limited aims
and often glancing successes of human rights movements into focus is simply to
demand another politics to supplement goals that are inadequate in the first
place and strategies that rarely work, especially in the socioeconomic domain. A
threatening enemy, rather than a powerless companion, is what market
fundamentalism demands.

75. For this reason, it seems mistaken to me for O’Connell to treat human rights norms as the
main normative standards against which to judge neoliberal globalization wanting, and to motivate the
call for a subaltern globalization. After all, there is a wide range of ends international human rights are
simply not trying to achieve, equality perhaps first among them.
76. Cf. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101 (2002). When Kennedy revisited his classic essay ten years later, his verdict
was different—and in my opinion more correct: “Perhaps the [human rights] movement bit off more
than it could chew.” David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Still Part of the
Problem?, in EXAMINING CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (Rob Dickinson et al. eds.,
2012).

